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Firms have to face several serious trade-offs with regard to the organisation and management of 
R&D activities. Incumbents, in particular, have to invest in R&D in order to maintain and improve 
their competitiveness but at present they often have to do so in increasingly difficult markets, which 
provide them with scarce resources. They have to be carefully informed about scientific and 
technological progress related to their industries, collaborate with dynamic partners, and 
simultaneously maintain some key technological competences and proprietary knowledge. They 
need to seek for talents and opportunities worldwide, while they keep an R&D base in their home 
countries. 
The main topic discussed in this paper is the complexity posed by the trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation in R&D, especially for established industrial organizations. Among the 
possible dimensions that can be used to analyse this issue, this paper will focus on the type of 
technological change, with respect to the firm’s core technologies, on the one hand, and on the 
control of the relevant complementary assets and knowledge in a particular industry, on the other 
hand. Both academics and manager might extract insight from the proposed approach. The 
theoretical framework applies concepts which are known in the industrial dynamics literature, but 
which probably represent an original adaptation for R&D management. Managers could find the 
integration between the framework and the case studies a valuable point for discussion about their 
own organisations, especially when serious trade-offs do exist and when strategic decisions have to 
be made. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we start by discussing the theoretical framework 
which defines possible strategic approaches that firms can adopt in different technological and 
competitive environments. In section 3 we briefly discuss the methodology used to promote the 
empirical analysis. Then in sections 4 to 7 we present four practical cases as examples of the 
strategic choices discussed in the mentioned framework. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The analysis of technological and competitive forces: a theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework which is here presented consists of a decision tree that can be used to 
describe the technological and competitive landscape. This framework identifies strategies which 
companies can adopt in order to take advantage of their competitive positions, R&D investments 
and complementary assets according to different situations. The four different scenarios which have 
been identified are presented in Figure 1.  
The first dimension which we take into account is the type of technological change that the 
industry is experiencing, which can be incremental or radical. The second dimension regards both 
complementary assets and the presence of a dominant design. More precisely, in situations of 
incremental technological change, the control of the firm over complementary assets represents a 
key variable to be considered. In fact, an incremental technological change does not alter the need 
of incumbents to get access to these assets for the exploitation of the new technology. The relative 
importance of complementary assets is therefore likely to remain unaltered. Incumbents that control 
these assets have a clear advantage for the exploitation of the technology. In situations of radical 
technological change, on the other hand, the phase of development of the industry needs to be taken 
into account. A radical change in the industry is in fact likely to lead to the emergence of a new 
dominant paradigm, which may change the relative importance of the complementary assets owned 
or controlled by incumbents. In order to understand what the most appropriate R&D strategy can 
be, it is necessary to consider whether the firm is already in control of the dominant design or if it is 
competing with other firms for its definition.   3
A very useful contribution in support of the basis of the proposed theoretical approach is a 
contribution by Freeman and Perez (1988), who take into account different types of technological 
dynamics. What characterizes their taxonomy is the “proximity of the effect of change” with respect 
to the centre of innovation. When a technology is going through very turbulent dynamics we 
observe innovations that lead to new technological systems, the appearance and disappearance of 
new paradigms, and the convergence of separate knowledge and technological domains. Examples 
of turbulent technological dynamics are the adoption of system-on-chips and the advent of CAD in 
the semiconductor industry. Convergence of TLC and IT offers a similar example for the 
telecommunication industry. Sectors like automotive and optical telecommunication systems are 
characterized by more clearly defined technological trajectories. In these sectors, the acquisition of 
appropriate resources and competencies might be expensive, and competencies and resources that 
have to be acquired and used in order to compete are commonly known. Technological change is 
also a constant factor for mature industries but efforts in these cases are usually directed towards 
incremental innovations, since disruptive innovations are hardly expected or difficult to predict. 
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With regard to a more precise description of the proposed model, when the type of technological 
change is incremental, firms cannot profitably focus their competitive strategies on the exploitation 
of new technologies, and key competencies are usually located downstream in complementary 
assets, and consist of distinctive manufacturing and marketing capabilities. While few spaces are 
left for new entrants in the industry, the main concern of leading incumbent firms is to defend their 
position and to avoid competition. This often calls for a rationalization of internal processes (among 
which R&D activities), in order to gain economies of scale and increase the gap of efficiency with 
respect to potential entrants, hence creating strong barriers to entry. R&D efforts are in these cases 
mostly directed towards the incorporation of new processes and incremental innovations on the 
existing products, rather then towards the development of radically new products. In these 
situations, the pressure on cost minimization is extreme. Consequently, licensing and spin-off are 
often identified as proper strategies to diversify activities beyond consolidated corporate businesses. 
Also, in the case of incremental technological change, companies that do not control key 
complementary assets will find significant difficulties to leverage their technological knowledge as 
a competitive weapon. Unless the new technology is by far better than the previous one (and often, 
even in this case) their resources may well be insufficient against market leaders, whose key 
advantages are represented by consolidated manufacturing and marketing strengths. Rather, in order 
to benefit from (successful) R&D activities, new entrants may have to share their novel 
technologies with other partners that own complementary competencies. In some cases, 
technologies can be conveniently sold or licensed out to incumbents (Arora et al., 2001; Gans and 
Stern, 2003). 
When radical technological changes take place, non-leading competitors can take advantage of 
new business opportunities by trying to impose a different industrial structure and possibly new 
dominant paradigms. If new entrants succeed in managing the new technologies and acquire the 
necessary complementary competencies – e.g., by defining an effective network of non-competitive 
relationships with external partners – they can pose a serious threat for market leaders. New 
technological trajectories do provide potential entrants with the opportunity to enter markets and 
play a key role. Traditionally, we have seen Japanese companies playing the role of outsiders and 
achieving important results in the consumer electronics, automotive, motorcycle industries 
(Womack et al., 1990; Mintzberg et al., 1996; Glasmeier, 2000). The advent of e-commerce and 
disruptive changes in distribution channels created tremendous opportunities for companies such as 
Amazon, eBay and Dell, that reinvented key concepts for the industry (Fields, 2004).    4
Also, in situations of radical technological change, R&D managers should recognize the need to 
combine resources that originate from different sources. Leaders within the old technological 
paradigms will be likely to seek for new strategic partnerships and technological alliances will 
represent once more key assets for the control of emerging markets (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
New entrants might leverage new knowledge and capabilities accumulated somewhere else. The 
impact of different technological regimes on the competitive and cooperative behaviour of 
established firms has already been studied in the literature
2. For instance, Garud (1994) suggests 
that during the early stages of technology development, when the pace of technological change is 
fairly rapid, rivals will compete with one another to establish technology dominance in markets and 
institutions. By contrast, during later stages, when a dominant technology paradigm has emerged, 
rivals will enter into cooperative agreements with one another to establish a stable industry 
environment within which to recover their investments. 
In general, in the presence of turbulent technological environments, firms need to monitor 
different sources of technological change, well beyond corporate boundaries (Pavitt, 1984). The 
definition of standards and the imposition of new technological paradigms are at the heart of firms’ 
strategies, even if their competitive positions are weak, as in the case of (high-tech) start-ups. In 
fact, the dominance of old, mature markets and the experience accumulated in manufacturing 
processes might not represent sufficient barriers to defend market share. Both incumbents and new 
entrants need to have proper absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and relational 
capabilities (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995) in order to develop their specific technological 
vision and recognize new opportunities. The competitive advantages of established firms compared 







In order to provide provisional evidence of the different strategies that companies can adopt in 
the four situations described in the theoretical framework, we selected four case studies, one for 
each possible scenario, from Italian established manufacturing firms. These cases are among the 
most important experiences of private R&D activities presently active in Italy. 
It is worth noting that these four cases only represent examples of strategies that companies can 
adopt in each case, while a complete test of the framework would require broader empirical 
evidence supported by appropriate statistical analyses. As the first stage of a longer research 
programme, we started by selecting case studies that best fit the framework, at least in our opinion. 
Information collected for each case were the result of face to face interviews with CEOs of the 
four companies. We have had the opportunity of discussing with managers and researchers from 
Centro Ricerche Fiat and Tilab during the last 5-6 years, and during this period we collected 
interviews and documents about the two companies. We also have had the opportunity of talking 
with R&D managers from STMicroelectronics and Pirelli OT in the last two years.  
 
 
4. From monopoly to technology exploitation: Telecom Italia Lab 
 
The case of Telecom Italia Lab (TILab) during the 1999-2001 period shows that, with high 
technological turbulence and tight budget constraints, to stay on top of competitors for the 
definition of new technological paradigms is not an easy task. The presence of various incumbents 
and possible new entrants within an industry calls for a long term commitment to innovation. In 
such a context, the control (and diligent management) of the firm’s complementary assets does not 
provide a sustainable competitive advantage. During the 90’s, incumbents in the   5
Telecommunication (TLC) industry faced increasing pressures from discontinuous technological 
shifts and a changing competitive environment. More specifically, the convergence of 
Telecommunication and Information Technologies (IT) generated significant technological 
turbulence for large TLC operators. On the market side, the deregulation process in Europe led to 
the emergence of new actors which rendered the market more fluid and complex. In several 
countries incumbents, for the first time, faced a real competitive environment in the domestic 
markets. The necessary strategy to adopt was stricter control on overhead costs and in particular on 
R&D. 
One of the possible solutions was to let R&D centres autonomously seek for additional financial 
resources, especially from outside their industrial group, and to exploit externalities from R&D 
activities. One of the main sources of profitability shifted from the architecture of a functional and 
efficient network infrastructure, to the definition of advanced services. Therefore, research that 
could previously focus on “hard components” (TLC networks) had to now look into “soft variables” 
(such as services). This shrunk the time horizon of research projects and also called for new skills, 
competencies, and forms of understanding of market dynamics. All this determined closer 
cooperation between (research) labs and (operating) departments. It seemed necessary for R&D 
centres to incorporate the functions of an innovation hub (Leifer et al., 2000) which is able to gather 
innovative ideas inside the industrial group and to hunt for opportunities and talents wherever 
possible.  
These strategic choices often translated into internal spin-offs and incubators as well as setting 
up specialized competencies for the marketing of inventions produced in the laboratories. New 
corporate venture capital activities were also used to detect and attract new ideas, technologies or 
business opportunities.  
During the 90’s, Telecom Italia (TI) - the former monopolist TLC operator - undertook radical 
changes, which affected the role and organization of its research labs. The first change was the 
privatization of the former public monopolist - although the Italian State retained golden-share 
privileges - and the consequent creation of the TI Group. A second important event was Roberto 
Colaninno’s acquisition of the group in February 1999. Colaninno was the CEO of the 
Omnitel/Tecnost Group, the largest (new) competitor of (incumbent) Telecom Italia. Antitrust laws 
prevented the creation of a new (private) quasi-monopoly, and Omnitel had to be sold. However, 
Colaninno’s presence in TI lasted merely two years. A new buyout in 2001 led the industrial group 
Pirelli to control TI. 
During this period, Cselt (later renamed TiLab), the group’s R&D centre, with about 1,000 
people, enlarged its mission and changed its organization. The result was a completely renewed 
research centre, organized in three business areas: Technology Integration & Research, Venture 
Capital, and ICT Skill Building. The objective of these changes was to create an extremely flexible 
organization, able to integrate new realities through the creation of autonomous units, partnership 
with external subjects, and financial participation to new entrepreneurial activities. For almost two 
years, from 2001 to 2002, Telecom Italia Lab was part of the venture capital unit of the Group.  
Besides the activities of traditional competence retention, in 2001 TiLab started to support 
internal spin-off processes and incubator structures in order to promote a sort of “controlled external 
spillover” of its personnel. The management gave researchers the possibility to develop projects in a 
quasi-market environment, with the necessary autonomy, but not with all the risks connected with 
normal entrepreneurial activity. This independence was short-lived. One of the first moves of the 
new Pirelli management was to review the responsibilities given to TiLab, and to move back the 
venture capital team to TI.  
The changes, which have taken place in the TLC sector and specifically in the R&D centre’s 
ownership, have not allowed the emergence of a robust strategic direction. The top management in 
the Telecom Group has struggled to deal with the changing competitive dynamics of the TLC 
sector, and only after that has tried to devise a strategy for the R&D lab. During the last months of 
Colaninno’s period and in the first months of Pirelli’s period, the project of joining together venture   6
capital competencies and assets with scientific and technological resources has become clear. 
However it would have required an even stronger commitment in communication, diffusion and 
incentives for researchers. 
During a period in which the transition in TiLab required still more resources and open support 
from the new top management, recent events seem to suggest that indeed the intention is to change, 
once again, the strategy. TiLab refocused its activities towards more traditional R&D services for 
the Group, such as studies and feasibility tests, experiments, and normative specifications. The lack 
of positive results and a truly convincing success story from the model of “internal 
entrepreneurship” contributed to the decision to change direction. In 2004 TiLab employed 1,142 
people (among them 920 researchers), had a turnover of 143 million Euros and further increased its 
orientation towards working in applications for the Telecom Group. In the 2001-3 period about 150 
patent applications were presented. Further analysis on the future performance of TiLab and the TI 
Group will be needed to fully appreciate the direction and success of these subsequent choices. 
 
 
5. STMicroelectronics: combining internal R&D and network structure 
 
In 2003, ST's net revenues were $7.2 billion and net earnings were $253 million. ST was the 
world’s leading supplier of analog Integrated Circuits (IC’s), MPEG-2 decoders and ASICs in 2002. 
Since the year 2000, ST has consistently ranked among the top five semiconductor producers for 
revenues worldwide. 
Looking back, it was difficult to imagine that ST Microelectronics would have become one of 
the semiconductor industry’s greatest success stories. In 1987, when the French semiconductor 
company Thomson Sémiconducteurs (TS) merged with its Italian competitor SGS, few expected the 
new entity to challenge the semiconductor market for world leadership. 
Before the merger, SGS suffered from a crippling debt load, although the manufacturing 
organization was still profitable. Thomson, on the other hand, enjoyed a cleaner balance sheet but 
was operating at a loss. The semiconductor industry was dominated by American and Japanese 
companies, and other Asian countries with lower labour costs were poised to take over huge chunks 
of wafer production. It was not exactly the best time to think about a European champion in the 
semiconductor industry, especially one starting from the relatively weak positions of TS and SGS. 
Two main elements contributed to ST success: first, ST defined a coherent recruiting and R&D 
strategy based on the notion that quality research and technological capabilities existed not only in 
the central hubs of the semiconductor industry but also in peripheral locations worldwide. 
Technological sourcing and a close relationship with key customers are important elements to fully 
capture the value of a complex R&D network. Second, ST was among the first companies that 
perceived and correctly interpreted the potentially disruptive impact of the system-on-chip (SoC) 
architecture. 
Throughout the 80s and 90s, relevant changes affected the semiconductor industry. In terms of 
the innovation path that was followed, Moore’s law accompanied the constant upgrade of 
manufacturing technologies. Also, on the demand side - in the electronic sector - a vast amount of 
new applications required more sophisticated silicon supports. Vertical control of the technologies 
for many consumer applications became impossible. One of the main sources of competitive 
advantage became the definition of standards for specific phases of production, with the goal to 
create lock-in situations for “open but owned” systems (Borrus and Zysman, 1997). 
The development of semiconductors towards the use of MEMS called for the integration and 
interaction of scientific competencies and languages that were not accustomed to work together. 
The approach adopted by ST recognized the limits of both vertical control of technology and 
innovation by acquisition. This is why tight alliances with key customers, suppliers, and 
technological partners became fundamental aspects of ST’s strategy in facing a very challenging 
competitive environment. According to ST management, in order to make the collaboration fruitful   7
for both ST and its partners, the “identification of the right tasks for the right people” (Cuomo, 
2003) was a crucial element.  
On the technology side, a number of phenomena such as the development of CAD and new e-
commerce practices facilitated a global vertical disintegration of the semiconductor industry 
(Macher, Mowery et al., 2002). In this new model, fabless companies localized in the most 
innovative regions, and foundries were built by local contractors or by the mother companies in 
more peripheral sites, in order to exploit other types of location advantages (Leachman and 
Leachman, 2003). 
During this time of drastic transition for the industry, ST was able to establish an effective 
division of labour on a global scale. The firm developed an almost a-centric structure, with key 
roles assigned to “internal entrepreneurs” who were able to direct resources to the various nodes of 
the corporate network (Fisher, 2002). 
ST also decentralized its R&D function, engaging in technological partnerships with peripheral 
regions. Only untill a few years ago, innovation in the periphery, and in particular the decision to 
locate R&D facilities in places like Catania (Sicily), was against the common practice in the 
semiconductor industry. However, this choice was taken according to a coherent logic, i.e. to locate 
to where there was public investment in research and abundance of unexploited high quality human 
resources at a reasonably low price. Also, it is well known that the absence of other equally 
interesting employment opportunity increases researchers’ corporate loyalty and thus determines 
efficient barriers for the loss of key technological competencies.  
During the phases of development of the system-on-chip applications, ST’s strategy for R&D 
proved to be particularly valid for the definition of a new system architecture. In the SoC design, 
performance of the chip can be optimized only if the solution is tuned for its application. Because 
the optimized new design is based on the customers’ application needs, close interaction with 
customers must be the key element for success as well as the SoC maker’s internal system level 
knowledge. ST defined strategic partnerships with its twelve most important clients. Over time 
these alliances matured into a clear interdependence, where innovations of the customer’s product 
rely on the innovation of the SoC module and vice versa. This mutual dependency of module and 
product system made these strategic partnerships important complementary assets that “co-
developed” (Teece, 1986) with the innovation. 
Even if ST was able to secure intellectual property rights around SoC, knowledge that was not 
developed internally was the result of key alliances with universities both in Europe and in the 
USA. According to ST managers (Cuomo, 2003), the access to research projects and the definition 
of agreements for the exploitation of research findings was a priority for the success of the project. 
The localization of ST manufacturing, design and R&D was an indispensable complementary asset 
for the integration of the various source of knowledge. In fact, (i) the location of fabs and R&D 
centres in peripheral locations allowed ST to exploit consistent cost savings, both for its product 
development and its manufacturing activities; (ii) design centres located close to the customers 
allowed ST to have a constant feedback from its “lead users” and (iii) the development of the SoC 
solution became possible when a large firm like ST established control over a distributed network 
of collaborations and research projects. 
 
 
6. Autonomy and technology transfer: Centro Ricerche Fiat (CRF) 
 
Centro Ricerche Fiat (Fiat Research Centre – CRF) is one of the 12 subsidiaries of the Fiat 
Group; it employs 930 people, its 2004 revenues were 124 million Euros and in the same year 
active patents were 1,211. CRF has been founded in 1976, and soon later became an independent 
centre of the Fiat Group. Significant autonomy from the mother company and efforts to find new 
clients for its (research) outputs among large and, especially, small firms – quite often Fiat 
mechanical suppliers – have been constant key aspects of CRF’s recent strategy. Nonetheless, 2003   8
and 2004 have been years of intense changes in the Fiat Group top management; Fiat’s whole 
strategy has been redefined, with significant consequences on the role played by CRF within the 
Group. These modifications are still in progress and it is only possible to provide some provisional 
interpretation. For this reason we will here focus on the important managerial choices adopted by 
CRF prior to these very recent changes. 
CRF has been traditionally characterized by a high degree of independence from the Fiat Group, 
mainly as the result of events which took place during the 90s. In 1993, most Fiat sectors reacted to 
the automotive industry crisis by refocusing their activities and by reducing the overall number of 
employees. However, in this period CRF tried to keep all employees with an effort to diversify the 
sources of revenues, by increasingly taking part in publicly funded research programs, and by 
offering its services to customers external to the Group. The early success of this strategy gave CRF 
a sense of independence and dynamism which revealed much more valuable than what simple 
budget figures could imply. The most relevant effect of this new approach has been an increasing 
attention to technology transfer that, in the words of a widely cited CRF’s slogan, becomes “CCCP: 
Competitiveness for Customers at Competitive Prices”. 
The automotive sector, in which CRF operates, is a rather mature industry, whose main 
technologies are widespread among competitors, and radical, or at least “more than incremental” 
innovations are not developed frequently. Hence, the technological domain is characterized by a 
certain stability. From a competitive point of view, the industry is dominated by a few large groups 
which operate on a global scale. Fiat has been part of this leading group of firms for a large part of 
the last few decades. 
As described in Section 2, in such a context the main concern of an incumbent firm is to 
rationalize R&D expenditures, in order to maintain a leading position, and also possibly increase 
the returns from R&D and its complementary assets. The case of CRF appears to be a quintessential 
example of the way this strategy can be pursued. Indeed, in order to maintain a leading position in 
research and simultaneously promote an effective transfer of technologies inside and outside the 
Fiat Group, CRF’s focus has been both on long-term exploration and on short-term exploitation 
strategies. However, funds to be devoted to the exploration of new technological trajectories had to 
be maintained independently from any specific goal regarding technology transfer. Possible sources 
of such (exploration) funds were (and still are) national and European funding agencies for the 
participation to public research projects. For this reason, during the last decades, CRF has 
constantly increased the participation to such programs, and, in turn, has had the possibility to 
maintain connections with the international scientific community. New competencies arising from 
this path have then been devoted to pursuing short-terms goals of technology transfer. 
Technology transfer, especially when directed at small firms – mainly Fiat suppliers – is 
considered by CRF the best solution to maximize R&D returns and to exploit existing technological 
competencies. In order to make technology transfer effective, a set of specific procedures has been 
implemented. More specifically, managers are regularly asked to look for “proper” clients, to 
develop “proper” products, and transfer “proper” human resources. CRF believes that this 
combination is the most effective way to transfer technological knowledge (Michellone, 1995). A 
thorough analysis of these activities is made before starting any transfer process, in order to identify 
concrete opportunities, the ways to transfer research results, and the existence of possible strategic 
constraints. As a consequence, it can be said that CRF’s strategy primarily derives its strength from 
a clear focus on customers. The identification of customers and their needs represents the first, 
initial phase of the process, and research activity follows at a later stage. Results only come at the 
end. 
The focus on customers, as well has a specific significance. For many firms - especially SMEs - 
the introduction of innovations and new technologies represent a drastic change in their 
organization, routines and capabilities. For this reason, CRF makes an effort to identify the proper 
persons within customers’ organizations in order to start effective interaction. These persons are 
those who will have to manage – and directly pay for – the innovation. More precisely, the price   9
customers have to pay does not only consists of a “monetary” component. The more radical the 
technological change, the higher the price in terms of new skills, competencies and knowledge. 
Complete success can be guaranteed only by reducing obstacles to the transfer, and by avoiding the 
“not invented here” syndrome. 
Ultimately, success of the transfer process depends on the correct definition of the “product” 
(the technological solution) to be transferred. Usually, these products are developed by offering 
additional features and characteristics that satisfy not only customers’ minimal expectations, but 
also their latent expectations. CRF’s goal is to take into account customers’ competitiveness and the 
markets where customers operate. In turn, CRF’s researchers are required not only to integrate 
know-how and competencies from different technological areas, but also to analyze the complex 
environment in which customers usually operate. 
Finally, the transfer process is usually complemented with the transfer of those researchers 
actively involved in the development of the new technology. Indeed, the transfer of human 
resources ensures that their tacit knowledge gets transferred with the technology as well. One 
further advantage of this approach is that those same researchers will represent the future preferred 
interface between CRF and the customer. The network of former researchers allows CRF to create 
even stronger links with its clients’ portfolio. 
In a sector like automotive, where the main competitive capabilities lie downwards in 
production and marketing, R&D activities usually represent a net cost to be maintained under strict 
control. CRF has been able, during the last two decades, to preserve relevant innovative capabilities, 
while reducing the overall need of financial resources for R&D. At the same time, an effective 
integration of both exploration and exploitation strategies showed to be compatible with the strategy 
described. Very recently, moreover, the Fiat Group has been paying increasing attention to both the 
knowledge producing and the technology transfer skill of the CRF and has funded large medium 
term research projects with the aim of transferring their results to the various Group’s divisions. In 




7. Pirelli OT: when the “market for firms” becomes the “market for 
technology” 
 
Pirelli’s core business is represented by tyres, energy cables and systems, telecom cables and 
systems, and real estate. Tyres and energy cables are the traditional (historical) businesses for 
Pirelli, in which it plays a leading role in the international market. By contrast, Pirelli has entered 
the telecom cables market only recently, and its role can be assimilated to that of a new entrant. The 
competitive position that Pirelli had in this market, the characteristics of the technological domain, 
and the choices that Pirelli made in this business make it a peculiar example of strategies that firms 
can adopt in situations of incremental technological change in industries where the company is not 
in control of key complementary assets. 
Indeed, at the end of 2000, Pirelli’s R&D activities attracted international attention when the 
company made an important deal for the sale of its optical division with the American company 
Corning. That agreement represented an interesting example of the strategies that companies can 
pursue for the exploitation of successful technological outcomes in situations in which they are new 
entrants (or minor actors) and in which technology dynamics are controlled by other incumbents, 
who set the pace of advancement within a technological paradigm. In fact, for Pirelli, a company 
not new to technological leadership, but not an historical presence in telecom cables market, the 
choice to sell its optical division to Corning was a first-time event. The analysis of the motivations 
that brought Pirelli to this decision allows us to discuss the possible strategies that new entrants can 
adopt in similar situations.   10
Before 2001, the Pirelli group comprised two main divisions, Pirelli Tyres and Pirelli Cables & 
Systems, which provided about 40% and 60% respectively of total turnover
3. The Cables & Systems 
division was further divided into the Energy and the Communication divisions, and Communication 
was finally composed of three branches, Optic Cables, Optical Components and Submarine Optical 
Systems. The optical components research and manufacturing activities were conducted by Optical 
Technologies (OT). This small American subsidiary, based in Delaware and partly owned by Cisco 
Systems, later became part of the Corning’s deal. 
While OT’s contribution to the total revenues of the Pirelli’s group was marginal, Corning’s 
evaluation of the venture was 167 times its 2002 revenues, which were approximately 22 million 
dollars. Ultimately, Corning ended up paying 3.6 billion dollars for Pirelli’s 90% share of the 
company. To understand the motivations behind such a decision, it is worth recalling the 
competencies of OT and compare the different business strategies pursued by Corning and Pirelli. 
OT’s activities were directed towards the development and manufacturing of optical 
components and technologies. Particularly relevant were the technologies for the production of 
lithium niobate modulators, and of submarine 980-nm pump diodes. These technologies were used 
in high-speed, long-haul optical communication networks. These two technologies were particularly 
relevant to Corning, in order to enhance its position as a supplier of photonic products to optical 
layer companies. Furthermore, OT’s capabilities in pump lasers for submarine use directly 
complemented Corning’s terrestrial pump capabilities (CED, 2000). 
From Corning’s point of view, the real value of OT was not measured by its current market 
share or manufacturing capabilities, but laid in its technological competencies. In the words of 
Pirelli’s chairman, Marco Tronchetti Provera, “Corning saw hidden value” in the firm’s optical 
patents (Business Europe, 2000). Corning, indeed, was investing heavily in the optical fibers 
telecommunication systems, and was aiming to become one of the few market leaders in such a 
sector. The technologies developed by OT could play a particularly important role. Furthermore, the 
growth estimations for the market for optical communication were very promising and the amount 
paid to Pirelli was therefore compatible with projected profits. 
Pirelli, on the other hand, had very different strategic needs. Optical components only had 
marginal importance in Pirelli’s business portfolio. In fact, in order to become competitive in the 
optical component market, Pirelli needed a much larger market share. At the same time, OT had 
developed relevant technological know-how, ready to be exploited. By selling OT to Corning, 
Pirelli had the possibility to extract the maximum value from its technological assets in optical 
components, and to reinvest the money earned to reinforce its core businesses and to implement 
important diversification strategies. 
The key point of the Pirelli-Corning case is that when complementary technologies have to be 
combined in order to offer a complex system, the ownership of only a part of the technology does 
not allow the firm to extract all the possible rents. In this situation, the greatest value goes to the 
institution that controls and integrates the different components. While Corning was clearly acting 
in order to pursue such a goal, Pirelli’s competencies were limited to a marginal – albeit extremely 
valuable – aspect of the entire technological system. Furthermore, this asset was not contributing 
significantly to Pirelli’s core business, and it would have required relevant investments in 
complementary assets and technologies to be fully exploited. As it has been emphasized (Arora et 
al., 2001), the possibility to have a market for technologies and technological competencies 
represents an additional and valuable option for those firms with strong technological capabilities 
but weak complementary assets. The trade of firms represents an extreme but attractive solution to 




                                                 
1 It is worth mentioning that at present the Pirelli Group can count on the Pirelli Labs, located in Milan, which have two 
divisions, Optical Innovation and Material Innovation.   11
 
Industrial R&D centres cannot develop internally all the research that their mother company or 
corporate level might need. At the same time, no clear recipe for an effective network structure, 
able to combine internal R&D effort and collaborations, can be provided. Management is confirmed 
once more, and perhaps some useful considerations can be obtained by analysing the cases through 
the lenses of the theoretical framework which has been presented. 
The analysis of the four cases described in this study confirms, among other things, that the 
management of trade-offs between exploration and exploitation in R&D has to be modulated given 
the firm’s relative position with respect to both the existing technological and competitive domains. 
A first conclusion is that, in presence of both incremental or radical technological change,  a 
successful management of the trade-off requires the definition of effective network structures. CRF 
and ST seem to have been particularly capable in adopting specific solutions to build and maintain 
dynamic network relations. CRF -operating in a more mature industry- developed intense relations 
with its clients, which in most cases are Fiat’s suppliers. ST, in a more turbulent technological 
landscape, developed co-design partnerships with its clients/partners, and R&D collaborations with 
public and private “research suppliers”. Through these networks, CRF was able to find resources to 
sustain the scientific and technological performance of the group, and ST was able to monitor new 
technologies and develop competencies all over the world through an amazingly responsive 
network of collaborations.  
A second finding which applies to both situations of radical and incremental technological 
change, success is also based upon clear decision-making, which benefits from the presence of 
skilled natural leaders. In both CRF and ST, the contribution of their CEOs, Giancarlo Michellone 
and Pasquale Pistorio respectively, has been very important in defining, defending and further 
expanding strategic decisions. The way they have been able to motivate their immediate 
collaborators in the top management teams towards specific strategic commitments is remarkable, 
and greatly contributed to the successful implementation of the strategy. 
On the other hand, slow decision-making processes and poor organizational communication 
may have a negative impact on knowledge-intensive organizations. This is particularly so in firms 
where restructuring and ownership changes generate fears among researchers about outsourcing or 
drastic revisions of the R&D vision. From this point of view, the lack of a well-communicated 
vision produces particularly negative results in organizations whose task is to produce breakthrough 
results for science and technology.  
Another conclusion is that even large established companies might suffer from an increased 
dynamism in the technological domain. The case of TiLab is a clear example of a large incumbent 
R&D centre, equipped with all the complementary capabilities and assets, that is facing turbulent 
technological dynamics and which has not completely defined a strategy to maintain its position in 
the market. Clearly, the incapability of TiLab to find its own strategic conduct is partly the result of 
the period in which it was a State monopolist, and was used to compete in a legally protected 
environment. However, any established firm operating in such a technological environment would 
find it difficult to adopt appropriate strategies. 
Finally, the example of Pirelli, and the deal with Corning for the sale of Optical Technologies, 
shows that when a firm - even a large one - is not a leader in the target industry, the valorisation of 
an internal R&D investment through the market for technology can be a particularly interesting 
solution. In fact, if a new entrant has developed relevant technologies, which are far from its core 
business and if the vision of the top management is clear about the future growth patterns which are 
likely to be followed, the sale of a whole subsidiary might represent an effective strategy since new 
financial resources can then contribute to reinforcing the core activity. On the other hand, what 
might not be desirable is the sale of companies, or technologies, dictated by budget constrains rather 
than by a deliberate long-run strategy.  
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Dominant Design Exploitation. 
Firms that are in control of the dominant 
emerging design need to leverage their 
leading position by establishing strategic 
alliances and securing complementary assets. 
(STM case) 
Market for Technology. 
Firms should seek to leverage their 
investments in innovation on the secondary 
market for technology. 
(Pirelli Lab case) 
R&D Investment Exploitation. 
Firms will leverage their R&D investments 
through their main operations. New ways to 
leverage R&D capabilities through other 
business models should be explored. 
(CRF case) 
R&D Exploration. 
Incumbents in the industry might be 
competing for the definition of a dominant 
design. Firms need to invest in innovation, 
since old complementary assets may not be 
sufficient to maintain leadership. 
(TiLab case) 
Type of 
technological 
change 
INCREMENTAL 
RADICAL 
Control of 
complementary 
assets 
Emergence of 
a dominant 
paradigm 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 